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ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND THE QUESTION OF




T HIS PAPER will provide a review and analysis of the available
evidence concerning the question of economies of scale and
the possibility of "natural monopoly" in the American airline in-
dustry. A review and analysis of this sort is directly relevant to the
two major public policy issues presently facing the airline industry:
mergers and the general deregulation of fares and eventually of
entry.
Economies of scale are frequently claimed as a justification for
mergers: the larger merged organization will have lower per-unit
operating costs than either of the smaller pre-merger firms. Does
the available evidence indicate that this is likely to be the case for
airline mergers?
At the same time, questions of economies of scale and natural
monopoly are crucial to the issue of deregulating fares; and entry.
We wish to know whether scale economies are relatively unim-
portant, so that there is room in the industry for a large enough
number of efficient-size airline companies to make the industry
workably competitive, that is, so that we can rely on the forces of
competition to keep prices at the minimum levels consistent with
normal profits and do not need direct regulation to achieve this
* Associate Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion, New York University; Senior Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advis-
ers, 1978-79. B.A. 1964 Harvard University; M.S. (Econ.) 1965, London School
of Economics; Ph.D. 1969, Harvard University. An earlier version of this paper
was written under contract with the Public Interest Center for inclusion in the
Federal Trade Commission's comments in CAB Docket No. 31290. The views
expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the Council of Economic Advisors.
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goal;' or whether economies of scale are so substantial that there is
room in the industry for only one or two efficient size companies,
so that the industry would present serious monopoly or oligopoly
problems that would require regulation to achieve our pricing goal.
If the latter were the case, we might question the wisdom of an ex-
periment in deregulation. If, at the end of the experiment, only
one or two firms were still standing and regulation must be reim-
posed to prevent monopoly abuses, would the experiment be worth
the effort? The remaining firms might have lower unit costs and be
more efficient in a static sense, but we would have lost a number of
centers of initiative for innovation and new ideas. The gains might
not be worth the losses, and regulation would still be with us.
As we shall see, however, the available evidence clearly points
in a more optimistic direction. There does seem to be room for a
number of efficient-size airlines in the industry-surely at least as
many as the current number of domestic trunk and regional (local-
service) carriers, and quite possibly for a yet larger number. While
their number-eighteen or twenty at a minimum-may not be the
economist's picture of "perfect competition," it is surely large
enough to characterize the industry as workably competitive and
free of serious oligopoly problems that would warrant economic
regulation at the national level. And, when entry restrictions into
individual city-pair markets are eased, monopoly-oligopoly prob-
lems that might otherwise arise in individual city-pair markets
should be successfully kept in check by the threat of entry into those
markets by the (efficient-size) firms operating in other city-pair
markets, or even by de nouveau entry.
This evidence, then, also indicates that the efficiency gains from
airline mergers, especially in a deregulated context, are likely to be
slight. Prospective merger partners will likely have to offer some
other justification.
The remainder of this paper will be organized as follows: Part
II will define and discuss the general concepts of economies of scale
and natural monopoly. Part III will describe the methods that are
used to measure economies of scale. Part IV will review and ana-
lyze the available evidence on economies of scale in the airline in-
' To the extent that competition also provides an incentive for a firm to keep
its costs at the minimum level consistent with the output it chooses, this is an
added benefit from the competitive process.
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dustry. Part V will briefly discuss the role of entry, and Part VI
will offer some conclusions from this study.
Before proceeding further, we provide here a brief glossary of
abbreviations used frequently in the text: MES=Minimum efficient
size; ATM=Available ton-mile; ASM=Available seat-mile; RTM
=Revenue ton-mile; RPM=Revenue passenger-mile.
I. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND NATURAL MONOPOLY
In trying to measure economies of scale, we are seeking to de-
termine whether there is a cost advantage (in the sense of lower
unit or average cost) associated with size. Does a larger firm, solely
because of the technology of the industry, enjoy lower unit costs
relative to those of a smaller firm? If so, are these differences size-
able? (If a firm that was twice the size of another enjoyed only a
half percent cost advantage, we might well conclude that the cost
differences were not substantial enough to affect the ability of the
two firms to compete in the market; that the ability of each firm to
hustle, to control costs, to guess correctly about future trends in
the industry would be the important determinants of success in the
marketplace, rather than the small cost differential.) Further, what
is the range of output (size of firm) over which any cost advantages
might prevail? And is there a size level at which these cost ad-
vantages are virtually exhausted, so that firms which are larger
than this critical size enjoy no cost advantage over firms of this
critical size, or possibly even suffer cost disadvantages?
This last size point-the point of minimum efficient size (MES)
-when divided into the overall size of the market or industry, pro-
vides us with an estimate of the maximum number of efficient size
firms that the market will support;' i.e., if the MES is x and the size
of the market is y, then the maximum number of efficient size firms
the market can support is y/x.
Clearly then, if, for a given technologically determined MES, the
relevant market is small enough, there will be room for only one
efficient-size firm. If two or more firms were to be present in the
market and they were to compete actively, the lower costs of any
firm that became larger than the others should allow it to offer
'See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE Ch.
4 (1970), for further discussion.
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lower prices and out-compete the other firms; the end result should
be only a single (efficient-size) firm remaining in that market. This
is the situation which is technically termed "natural monopoly."
Its most frequent representation is in the form of local public utili-
ties, such as local electricity or natural gas distribution or local tele-
phone service. It provides the best justification for public utility
regulation, to prevent the monopoly from exploiting its monopoly
power.
It is worth noting, however, that regulation may not be necessary
to prevent monopoly abuses, even in this "natural monopoly" situa-
tion. If the barriers to entry into this market are relatively low, then
the existence of a number of potential entrants (most likely existing
firms serving other markets, but quite possibly new firms), ready
to enter the market if profitable opportunities arise, can keep the
natural monopolist's prices and profits close to competitive levels.
The effectiveness of this threat of entry will depend on such factors
as the size of the capital investment necessary to establish oneself
in the market, the time period involved, and the cost disadvantage
suffered by a small firm compared to a large firm. These potential
entry possibilities are probably not great for the local utilities.' But,
as will be argued below, the barriers to entry in airline markets (in
the absence of legal restrictions) appear to be quite low, and the
number of potential entrants quite high. Thus, there may well be
little room for monopoly abuse, even in small airline markets which
can support only one carrier at efficient scale."
To summarize, then, we are interested in measuring the extent
I But local competition between distribution of electricity and natural gas
seems to be significant. See Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in
PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 135 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
1 Further, as Demsetz has argued, even if entry is not easy once a producer
is established, regulation of natural monopolies might still be avoided by periodic
auctioning by the government of the monopoly franchise. If the product or service
is simple, the winner would be the bidder that promises the lowest price to the
public, e.g., the lowest parking fee at a municipal stadium. If the product is com-
plex or there are many products jointly produced, the winner would be the bidder
who pays the largest fee to the government for the franchise. In this case, the
public will still be paying the monopoly price (with the consumers' surplus dead-
weight loss that is associated with it), but the monopoly profits are recaptured for
the public treasury. Though this kind of bidding system may not currently be
legally feasible, it is an alternative worthy of future consideration. And it does
have current application in the areas of local franchises for garbage collection,
turnpike concessions, municipal stadium services, etc. See Demsetz, Why Regulate
Utilities?, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55 (1968).
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and range of scale economies and in trying to determine if there
is a point at which they are exhausted, so as to determine whether
a number of competitive firms are economically viable in an in-
dustry or market. Even if we should determine that only one firm
can efficiently serve a market, we may still have little fear of
monopoly abuse if the large firm's advantages are slight and/or
the barriers to entry are low.
III. THE METHODS OF MEASURING ECONOMIES OF SCALE
There are three major methods that can be used to try to measure
scale economies.' Each has its strengths and weaknesses. First, one
can try to measure company costs directly and, through cross-
section and/or time series statistical techniques, try to fit a cost
curve to the available data. This requires good, uniform cost data
on a cross-section (data for a number of firms at one point in
time) or time series (data for one or a number of firms over sev-
eral time periods) basis. It also requires firms that are produc-
ing a relatively uniform output; we would not learn much by
comparing apple producers and orange producers. An alternative
approach, which should measure virtually the same effects, is to
try to measure company profits on a cross-section or time series
basis and to fit an appropriate statistical function. If a group of
firms are in the same market, those with lower costs should be re-
porting higher profits. Yet another alternative approach which
ought to measure the same phenomena is to try to fit a production
function-a relationship between physical output and the physical
inputs that are necessary for the production of that output. If one
firm has lower unit costs than another and both face the same pric-
es for their inputs, the first must be using less inputs per unit of
output.
Besides the need for appropriate cost categories and uniform out-
put, another problem with the cost-profit-production function meth-
od has been raised by Milton Friedman.' Suppose that there is a
size of firm which has the lowest unit costs and that firms larger
or smaller than this size have higher costs; firms of that low-cost
5 A broader review is found in F. SCHERER, supra note 2, at Ch. 4.
'Friedman, Comment, in BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 230
(1955).
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size ought to be able to outcompete the firms of the "wrong" sizes.
The latter firms (which may have attained those sizes due to errors
of judgment) would begin to run losses. The original entrepreneurs
might wish to sell out. Any potential new owner, however, would
only buy a "wrong" size firm if he could acquire it cheaply enough
so that even with its higher operating costs he could still earn a
competitive profit; the new owner's capital investment costs will
be lower than the original owner's capital investment costs. Thus,
if we were to examine the costs of the "wrong" size firm a year or
two after it is bought by a new owner, we will discover that it has
the same apparent cost levels as the optimum size firm. In effect,
the financial market has capitalized away the errors of the "wrong"
size firm. And, Friedman argues, there may be a tendency for bal-
ance sheet adjustments (write downs) by "wrong" size firms to
take place even if they are not sold to a new owner. The conse-
quence is that, after these adjustments have taken place, cost or
profit studies will tend to indicate uniform unit costs for all size
firms.! Thus, cost-profit-production function studies relying on re-
ported company data may incorrectly indicate that size does not
affect unit costs, whereas the true underlying cost situation might
be one of economies of scale prevailing up to some point (and
possibly diseconomies of scale prevailing beyond that point).
A second method of measuring economies of scale, largely de-
veloped to deal with the criticism just mentioned, is the "survivor
technique."' If there is a lowest cost range of sizes this approach
theorizes, company sizes ought to gravitate toward that range.
Smaller firms ought to grow, larger firms ought to shrink, and new
firms which arise ought to aim for that range. Thus, over time, in
the absence of serious changes in technology, the percentage of an
industry output that comes from that size range ought to increase.
Observations, then, of the changing distribution of firm sizes over
time may be able to indicate the minimum cost range.
The survivor technique, though, is not without its problems. In
an industry with growing demand that also has substantial barriers
to entry, actual company size changes may not reveal meaningful
7 In production function studies, the same problem arises in trying to measure
the capital inputs of the firm. Their valuation may reflect the balance sheet ad-
justments that Friedman describes.
8 See Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J. L. & EcoN. 54 (1958).
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information on the minimum cost range of company size. Actual
attempts at using the survivor technique for empirical measurement
of efficient company size have not met with great success."
A third method is the "engineering approach." An investigator
can talk with engineers, plant managers, and other experts in an
industry to try to get estimates of the efficient (low cost) size for
a company. The estimates clearly must be judgmental in nature,
and estimates by engineers in particular tend to be overly optimistic
as to the low cost nature of large plants, since they tend to neglect
the costly management problems associated with large scale opera-
tions.
As we shall see in the next section, most of the scale economy
estimates for the airline industry are based on cost curve efforts.
Fortunately, the criticisms of this method have less force for the
airline industry than they might for other industries. First, the air-
lines produce a fairly uniform, standardized output. The necessary
adjustments for diversity of output (primarily the distance between
city-pairs served and the density of traffic) are easily achieved.
And, second, reasonably well defined cost categories for reporting
are required by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). There should
be few of the balance sheet adjustment problems mentioned above.
Since so much of the effort on airline scale economies involves
the estimation of cost curves, a very brief summary of the concept
and method is probably worthwhile. The usual approach postulates
that a firm's costs of producing output are related to the level of
output chosen, the costs of the inputs into the production process,
the nature of the output mix, etc. If we choose to measure costs
as average costs per unit of output, we can formally express their
relationship as
Y = f(X,, X 3, X . )
where Y is the average cost per unit of output and the X,, X, .
are the elements, such as the volume of output itself, the input
prices, etc., which help explain the level of average (unit) costs.
To actually estimate this relationship empirically, investigators
usually postulate a linear relationship (either linear in the actual
'See Saving, Estimation of Optimum Size Plant by the Survivor Technique,
75 Q.J. ECON. 569 (1961); Weiss, The Survival Technique and the Extent of
Suboptimal Capacity, 72 J. POL. ECONOMY 246 (1964); Shepherd, What Does the
Survivor Technique Show About Economies of Scale?, 34 S. ECON. J. 113 (1962).
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numbers or linear in logarithms) between Y and the X's; i.e.,
Y = a+ bX 1 + cX + dX 3 ...
With data on individual company costs, output volumes, input
prices, etc., from a cross-section and/or time series, the coefficients
(a, b, c, etc.) can be estimated through econometric (statistical re-
gression) methods.
In the airline context, Y (the left hand or dependent variable)
is usually expenses (costs) per ATM, per RTM, per ASM, or per
RPM. The X's (the right hand, or independent or explanatory vari-
ables) usually include an output measure (such as ATM, RTM,
ASM, or RPM) which should capture the scale effect we are seek-
ing, plus other variables such as flight length, traffic density, input
prices, etc., which we wish to correct for (or hold constant) while
trying accurately to measure the scale effect. The coefficient on the
output term is usually the crucial one for our purposes. If there are
economies of scale, then larger outputs should be associated with
lower unit costs; i.e., the coefficient on the output terms should be
negative. If economies of scale are negligible, this coefficient should
be very close to zero; that is, output levels should have no appre-
ciable effect on unit costs. And we can apply the usual tests of sta-
tistical significance to determine if the coefficient is or is not sig-
nificantly different from zero.
IV. ACTUAL ESTIMATES OF AIRLINE SCALE ECONOMIES
A. The Choice of Measurement Level
There are three alternative levels at which economies of scale
might be measured. At one end of the range, one might choose the
city-pair as the relevant market and ask how an airline's costs vary
with the number of passengers carried annually between the two
cities. At a broader level, one could ask if there are further ad-
vantages (or disadvantages) to operating a local network of routes;
i.e., a set of interconnecting city-pairs. Finally, one might try to
measure scale economies at the national or regional level of opera-
tion at which most airline companies function; i.e., to measure
economies of scale for the range of output over which the current
airlines are operating.
The distinction between these three levels-particularly between
the first two and the last-is crucial to the understanding of the
MONOPOLY IN AVIATION
problem of measuring scale economies in the airline industry. As
George C. Eads has pointed out, there are two basic ways in which
an airline can increase in size: by traffic increasing on an existing
set of routes (i.e., by traffic density increasing); or, by the airline
acquiring an additional set of routes that have more or less the
same traffic density as the existing set." Suppose that there are eco-
nomies of scale up to some point for the former process, that more
densely traveled routes have lower unit costs. This by itself tells us
nothing about possible economies of scale for the latter process.
Since all of the domestic airlines, trunk and local-service alike, con-
sist of fairly extensive networks of varying densities, it is vital to
keep these two components of scale separated. It makes eminently
good sense to ask, first, are there economies of scale to greater
density over a city-pair or a small local network, and then, second,
are there further economies achieved by having a larger airline
which consists essentially of a collection of these local networks.
Most of the quantitative estimates of scale economies in airlines
are focused on this last, company-wide level. Fortunately, it is at
this level that we can answer the important policy questions raised
at the beginning of this paper. Are mergers of these companies
likely to achieve appreciable economies, of scale? What is the struc-
ture of the airline industry likely to be on a national basis after sub-
stantial price competition is permitted? Will only one or two firms
survive, or is there room for enough efficient-size firms so that the
competitive process can be left largely unregulated?
We will first review and discuss these company-wide estimates
of scale economies. We will then focus on the more limited evi-
dence available on local network effects and individual city-pair
markets.
B. Estimates of Scale Economies at the Company-Wide Level
As we indicated above, and as most investigators have realized,
one cannot simply use an output measure, such as ATM's or RTM's,
and then relate costs to these output measures without further ad-
justments. Given the current technology of the industry, it appears
to be more costly per passenger-mile to serve thinly traveled and
10 Or, as Eads also includes, by a carrier dropping thinly traveled routes and
adding more heavily traveled routes. This has the same effect as increasing aver-
age traffic density. See G. EADs, THE LOCAL SERVICE AIRLINE EXPERIMENT 72-73
(1972).
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shorter distance routes than to serve heavily traveled and longer
distance routes. The fixed terminal costs per passenger at each end
of the trip and the lower costs per seat mile of the larger long dis-
tance jets versus the smaller short distance jets are responsible for
these cost differences. Since the current airline companies are re-
stricted by the CAB in the particular markets they can serve, their
cost levels are at least partly determined by the characteristics of
the markets that they serve.
If one were to ignore this market characteristic phenomenon,
one might immediately conclude, for example, that the local-service
airlines were less efficient and below minimum efficient size com-
pared to the trunk airlines, since the former consistently have high-
er unit costs than do the latter. Hence, this conclusion may not be
justified or at least cannot be reached just by looking at the cost
and output data alone. Indeed, this is a general problem in making
these cost comparisons. There is a general pattern prevailing across
the airline industry, including the trunks and the regionals, that
the larger carriers tend to fly the thicker, longer routes, while the
smaller carriers, tend to fly the thinner, shorter routes.
This pattern can be seen in Table 1. The trunks uniformly are
larger, fly longer flights, and enplane more passengers per route
served than do the local-service carriers. And they have uniformly
lower costs per ATM. The consistency in the rankings is seen in
the first part of Table 2, where all of the rank correlation coeffi-
cients for the combined truck and local-service industry are posi-
tive and significant at the five percent level. Within each carrier
category, the correlation coefficients still tend to be positive (ex-
cept for the trunks with respect to operation costs), though only
two are statistically significant.
This comparability problem, which is basically the problem men-
tioned in Part III of ensuring that the firms in our sample are pro-
ducing comparable outputs, is important to keep in mind as we
review the scale economy estimates below. We will take special
note of those studies which do or do not try to adjust for this com-
parability problem.
We now turn to these studies. We will present them in chrono-
logical order, starting with the earliest that may still have relevance
for today's airline industry.
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Table 1: TRUNK AND LOCAL SERVICE CARRIER CHARACTERISTICS,
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS, YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 1975
Daily En-
planements Operating
RPM's (in Stage per Station Cost per





































a. Calendar year 1974.
b. Year ending September 1974; 1975 affected by strike.
Source: II and III SIMAT, HELLIESAN AND EICHNER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EF-
FECTS OF ROUTE RESTRICTION REMOVAL AND DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY: THE
TRANSITION TO A LESS REGULATED ENVIRONMENT, Appendix Tables (1977).
(1) Caves.11 Richard E. Caves examined the cost data for the
airline industry for the late 1950's. He combined simple cost com-
pilations, cost curves fitted by eye to a scatter of routes, and eco-
nometric regressions. He recognized the problem of market charac-
teristics and even provided a table" indicating how costs per RPM
vary with stage length (length of flight). But he did not make spe-
cific adjustments for varying market characteristics- when he pro-
vided his scale estimates.
Caves concluded that the domestic trunklines had all reached
" R. CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS Ch. 3 (1962).
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Table 2: RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Daily
Enplanements Operating
Stage per Station Cost per
RPM's Length Served ATM
Trunks and Local-Service Combined
RPM's 1.0
Stage Length 0.84* 1.0
Enplanements 0.93* 0.81* 1.0
Operating Costs 0.75* 0.76* 0.70* 1.0
Trunks Only
RPM's 1.0
Stage Length 0.35 1.0
Enplanements 0.80* 0.34 1.0
Operating Costs -0.30 -0.10 -0.45 1.0
Local-Service Only
RPM's 1.0
Stage Length 0.45 1.0
Enplanements 0.60 0.12 1.0
Operating Costs 0.68* 0.37 0.39 1.0
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Source: Table 1.
an output consistent with minimum efficient size (MES). This
critical point appeared to lie between 100 million and 200 million
ATM's annually. Since total domestic airline ATM's in 1958 were
5,379 million, " this would indicate that an MES firm was between
two percent and four percent of the total industry. Caves did not
offer any specific conclusions concerning the local-service carriers
but left the distinct impression that he believed they were below
MES.
(2) Gordon." Robert J. Gordon analyzed cost data for the do-
mestic trunklines for 1961. He adjusted various cost categories for
length of hop through econometric regressions and hand-fitted
curves, and he determined a standardized most efficient (mini-
3 This covers domestic service, including the intra-Alaskan and Hawaii serv-
ices.14 Gordon, Airline Costs and Managerial Efficiency, in TRANSPORTATION Eco-
NOMICS 61 (1965).
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mum) cost level. He then computed the cost saving that each
carrier could have achieved had it attained the most efficient
cost level.
Gordon found that it was the larger trunklines which were the
farthest away from these minimum costs, and he argued that this
was because the larger trunklines were over-manned. Thus, not
only did the larger trunklines fail to achieve any economies of
scale compared to the smaller trunklines, but they even appeared
to have higher unit costs.
(3) Straszheim."5 Mahlon R. Straszheim analyzed international
airline (U.S. and foreign) cost data for 1962. He computed a
set of econometric regressions which explained carrier costs as a
function of variables such as flight length, traffic density, and input
prices. The cost variable was direct costs per ASM. The equations
yielded sensible coefficients and generally had good fits.
When Straszheim then attempted to relate the residuals from
the equations (that is, the extent to which a carrier's costs exceeded
or fell short of the "expected" level of costs indicated by the equa-
tion which best fitted the available data) to the size of the carrier,
he found no relationship."6 Thus he concluded that there were no
economies of scale for the thirty-one carriers in his sample. Their
sizes (in 1962) ranged from fifty-eight million ASM's flown (Aden
Airways) to 11,395 million ASM's flown (Pan American Air-
ways); the mean for the sample was 1,467 ASM's. In that same
year, the American domestic airline industry (trunks plus local-
service) flew 63,867 million ASM's; the smallest trunkline, North-
east Airlines, flew 1,382 ASM's, and the smallest local-service car-
rier, Lake Central Airlines, flew 176 million seat-miles. Thus, all
of the American carriers were larger than the smallest firm in
Straszheim's sample, and all but the smallest of the American
trunks were larger than the average firm in the sample.
(4) Eads, Nerlove, and Raduchel.7 George C. Eads, Marc Ner-
love, and William Raduchel examined the cost data for twelve local-
15 M. STRASZHEIM, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 90-101, App. B
(1969).
Is Id. at 96.
17 Eads, Nerlove & Raduchel, A Long Run Cost Function for the Local Service
Airline Industry: An Experiment in Non-Linear Estimation, 51 REv. EcoN. STA-
Tisics 258 (1969).
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service carriers on a quarterly time series basis from 1958 through
1966. They developed a non-linear cost model which assumed
that the stock of pilots and co-pilots was the fixed input factor
in the short run. Their output (scale) measure was total aircraft
miles.
Using non-linear econometric estimation techniques, they found
a returns-to-scale factor for this sample of nearly 1.3; thus, one
local-service carrier which was twice the size of another would
be expected to have unit costs which were almost thirty percent
lower. This estimate, if it were accurate, would be evidence of sub-
stantial economies of scale at the local service level. But, as the
three authors point out, this estimate was biased away from 1.0
(constant returns to scale) because of the particular procedures
they used. Further, they provided no statistical confidence interval
on this estimate, so a reader cannot tell if the estimate was or was
not statistically different from 1.0. Further, as Eads later pointed
out, the 1958-1966 period was one of increasing traffic density for
the local-service carriers, achieved largely by the CAB permitting
the carriers to drop low density routes and expand to higher volume
markets." Since the Eads-Nerlove-Raduchel model did not correct
for this phenomenon, there was a further bias which pushed their
estimate away from 1.0." Finally, though this study did take into
account the different technologies of piston and jet aircraft, there
was no other correction for any technological improvements and
productivity increases that may have been taking place over the
1958-1966 period. Since productivity improvements and increases
in the scale of operations were both taking place at the same time,
the absence of the former in the regression estimations meant that
the coefficient on the latter may partly have incorporated effects
that were due to productivity improvements; if there were a tenden-
cy for unit costs to fall over time because of productivity improve-
ments and also for the scale of operations to increase, then there
may be a tendency improperly to attribute to the increasing scale
all of the credit for the lower unit costs. In the end, one is inclined
to agree with the three authors that "no evidence has been discov-
Is EADS, supra note 10, at 72-74.
19 This was pointed out to this author in a telephone conversation with George
Eads, Apr. 21, 1978.
MONOPOLY IN AVIATION
ered that the local-service airline industry is subject to substantial
increasing returns to scale.""0
(5) Jordan." William A. Jordan described the experience of the
California intra-state carriers in the 1950's and 1960's. He found
that, despite their smaller sizes, they were able to offer fares for
service in the California market that were lower than those of the
existing interstate carriers, and some were able to grow and pros-
per. He concluded from this rough "survivor" study that there were
no economies of scale beyond the point at which a carrier had ac-
quired four or five aircraft and could use them appropriately. This
would imply a very low MES indeed.
(6) U.S. DOT.'" As part of its filing for the CAB's Domestic
Passenger Fare Investigation, the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion analyzed cost data for the trunks and for the local-service
carriers for 1963-1968. Pooled cross-section and time series re-
gressions were run for the overall industry, for the trunks separate-
ly, and for the local-service carriers separately. Operating expense
(total, direct, and indirect) per ATM were the cost variables. The
right-hand variables included ATM's, average stage length, and
market density, all in logarithms. Dummy variables (0, 1) for each
year were also included; these provide a combined correction for
increasing input factor costs and improving productivity over these
years. All of the equations showed a good fit and sensible coeffi-
cients. 3
For the overall industry, the scale effect was statistically insigni-
ficant and quantitatively negligible in absolute terms for the total
operating expense per ATM regression. The same was true of the
regression for the trunklines only. For the local-service carrier re-
gression, the scale effect was statistically significant. But the quan-
20 Eads, Nerlove & Raduchel, supra note 17, at 268.
2" W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA: EFFECTS AND IMPERFEC-
TIONS Ch. 10 (1970).
22 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Testimony and Exhibits of the Department of Trans-
portation in Phase 7 of the Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, Exhibit No.
DOT-T-l, CAB Docket Nos. 28166 and 28167 (August 25, 1970).
23 One drawback to the procedure used in this study is that there is no correc-
tion for the effects of rivalry in individual markets. To the extent that rivalry ex-
tends beyond scheduling to such things as advertising, fancy food, or plush up-
holstery, a carrier's costs per ATM will be higher. Some correction for the per-
centage of competitive routes flown by each carrier would have been desirable.
This criticism also applies to both the Douglas and Miller studies below.
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
titative impact was not great; a ten percent increase in the size of a
local-service carrier yielded only a 0.6 percent decrease in unit
costs. This part of the DOT study ends with the sentence, "For all
practical purposes, then, we can conclude that the industry is char-
acterized by constant returns to scale."
(7) Eads.' George C. Eads analyzed the cost data for the local-
service carriers for the late 1950's and mid-1960's. He com-
puted a set of econometric cost equations and then concluded his
chapter with a three page discussion of economies of scale."
Though the statement was never made outright, it was clear from
this discussion that he believed that economies of scale for the local-
service carriers were non-existent or minimal. He stated clearly
that the cost disadvantages that the local-service carriers suffer
compared to the trunklines were due primarily to the short-haul,
low density nature of the former's routes and not to overall scale
effects.
(8) CAB Office of Plans." This study examined the cost data
for the domestic trunklines and local-service carriers for the years
1962-1969. Cost curves were estimated through econometric re-
gressions on a combined cross-section and time series basis. Both
stage length and traffic density (the latter by means of a variable
measuring aircraft size) were taken into account."' The cost vari-
ables used were operating expense per ATM and operating ex-
pense per RTM, with most emphasis given to the latter. The scale
variable was the number of annual departures per carrier. 8 The re-
gressions provided sensible coefficients, and the overall fits of the
equations were quite good.'
'
4 G. EADS, supra note 10, Ch. 3.
22 Id. at 72-74.
26 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, OFFICE OF PLANS, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN THE
DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY (1972).
27 The explanatory variables included in the regression were aircraft utilization,
unit labor costs, passenger load factor, and percentage of traffic generated in
monopoly markets.
26 The choice of departures as a scale variable is a curious one and, unfortun-
ately, it was not defended in the report. Though departures are surely correlated
with ATM's and RTM's, a more satisfactory procedure would have been to have
used either of the two directly.
29 Unlike the Eads-Raduchel-Nerlove study, this study did implicitly correct
for improving productivity over time by including a unit labor cost variable as
a right hand variable.
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When the data were pooled for the trunks and local-service car-
riers together, the cost per ATM equation indicated a statistically
insignificant scale effect. The cost per RTM equation, however, did
yield a statistically significant scale effect. The absolute magnitude
of this effect, however, was not large; the predicted unit cost ad-
vantage for the largest airline compared to the smallest airline in
1969-the former had seven times as many departures as the lat-
ter-was only 7.5 percent. This was far smaller than the actual
range of unit costs observed across the entire airline industry.
Further, the estimation of cost per RTM equations for the trunks
and for the local-service carriers separately indicated no statistically
significant scale effects for the former and statistically significant
(though mild in absolute terms) scale effects for the latter. Further
analysis indicated that the critical MES point appeared to be at
10,000 annual departures, with no further decreases in unit costs
beyond this point. By 1969 all carriers except Northeast Airlines
had achieved this size. Thus, the scale effects which were found to
be statistically significant for the local service airlines were occur-
ring through a comparison of their experience in the early 1960's,
when they had fewer than 10,000 annual departures and thus ex-
perienced higher costs, and their experience in the late 1960's,
when they largely exceeded 10,000 annual departures and were
thus experiencing the lower costs consistent with that larger scale.
The study concludes that, as of the early 1970's, all of the exist-
ing carriers, trunk and local-service alike, had reached MES, and
there were no further economies of scale to be achieved from more
extensive operations.
(9) Keeler." Theodore E. Keeler's effort was aimed at con-
structing a true long-run cost function for airline services. Much
of the construction was based on engineering data, but Keeler did
use econometric regression techniques to estimate a cost function
for airline indirect costs (e.g., expenses for sales, reservations, air-
craft cleaning and fueling, airport rentals, cabin service, and ad-
ministration). He used quarterly data for 1967-1969 for eight
trunklines. His cost variable was total indirect costs per ATM. His
righthand variables are ATM's, the load factor, and average stage
length.
" Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance, 3 BELL J. ECON. &
MGT. 399 (1972).
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Keeler found that the scale effect, though statistically significant,
was negligible in absolute terms. Again, constant returns to scale
appeared to be the best empirical description of the data.
(10) Reid and Mohrfeld." Samuel R. Reid and James W.
Mohrfeld examined domestic trunk cost and profitability data for
the period 1960-1970. They estimated a set of pooled time series
and cross-section regressions for this period, using cost per RPM
and profit per RPM as their left-hand variables and using only a
scale variable as their right-hand variable. They used total operat-
ing revenue and total assets as alternative measures of scale.
Reid and Mohrfeld concluded that there were diseconomies of
scale beyond the size of the smaller trunk airlines; that is, that the
larger trunks suffered cost disadvantages compared to the smaller
trunks. Unfortunately, this study was marred by a number of seri-
ous methodological flaws. First, there was no correction for traffic
density or flight length. This is just as important for the profitabil-
ity regressions as for the cost regressions. And second, the study
provided no corrections for the increased costs of inputs and the
technological improvements that were taking place over these elev-
en years.
The best one can say about this study, then, is that the authors'
claims could not be upheld from the evidence they provided.
(11) Douglas and Miller." George W. Douglas and James C.
Miller provided two analyses of trunklines cost data. The first used
cross-section and time series data for 1964-1970.' Their cost mea-
sures were total operating expense per ATM and direct operating
expense per ATM. Their output (scale) measure was ATM. They
computed a set of econometric regressions which also took into ac-
count stage length and traffic density (by means of a variable for
aircraft capacity).' They also included dummy variables (0, 1) for
the observations in each calendar year. The fit of the equations
was good, and the coefficients were reasonable.
The regression model chosen traced out a statistically significant
31 Reid & Mohrfeld, Airline Size, Profitability, Mergers, and Regulation, 39
J. Am L. & CoM. 167 (1973).
12 G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF DOMESTIC Am TRANS-
PORT 13-17, 146-149 (1974).
mId. at 13-17.
4 The percentage of flight departures from major hubs was also included.
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parabola relating total operating expense per ATM to ATM's. This
parabola peaked at four billion ATM's per carrier, slightly below
the size of the largest four trunklines for 1970.' The expected dif-
ferences in unit costs predicted by the equation for the complete
range of trunklines were quite small, and, because the largest trunks
were not yet far enough on the right hand (falling unit cost) side
of the parabola, the smaller trunks were expected to have lower
unit costs (as a function of scale effects) than were the larger
trunks.
The second Douglas and Miller analysis essentially duplicated
the U.S. DOT study,"8 but with a slightly longer time period (1962-
1970). The focus was exclusively on the trunk airlines. As did the
DOT study, Douglas and Miller found that the scale variable had
a statistically insignificant effect on unit costs. Overall, Douglas
and Miller concluded that there were no significant economies of
scale operating at the level of the trunk carriers.
(12) Mallet." Roger J. Mallet provided evidence on the con-
centration in the unregulated commuter airline segment of the in-
dustry. Concentration (the percentage of passengers nationwide
carried by the top ten commuter airlines, the top twenty, the top
thirty, etc.) declined substantially between 1970 and 1975. Table
3 reproduces these figures. During the same period, the overall
commuter airline industry grew by fifty percent, so the absolute
size of most commuter carriers, large and small alike, grew. But
these concentration figures indicate that the larger firms grew more
slowly than the smaller firms in the industry. If there were sub-
stantial economies of scale, we would expect the opposite to be
occurring. Accordingly, this type of "survivor" evidence indicates
' Note that a parabola peaking in the mid-range of firm sizes is the opposite
of the U-shaped cost curve of standard economic theory. The Douglas and Miller
parabola was achieved by using ATM's and ATM's-squared as separate right-hand
variables. Since these two variables are very likely to be highly correlated with
each other, this inverted parabola may be simply a statistical artifact caused by
the well-known econometric problem of high multicollinearity among right-hand
variables.
,' id. at 146-149. See note 22, supra.
3 Mallet, The Commuter Carrier Industry-Growth and Stability, in REFORM
OF THE ECONOMIc REGULATION OF AIR CARRIERS, Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1976).
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that even at the small end of the airline industry, the commuter
carriers, economies of scale do not seem very important.
Table 3: CONCENTRATION IN THE COMMUTER CARRIER
INDUSTRY: 1970 AND 1975
Concentration Ratio
Leading Carrier 1970 1975
Top 10 carriers 51.0% 41.8%
Top 20 carriers 67.8 60.7
Top 30 carriers 77.9 73.7
Top 40 carriers 84.8 81.1
Top 50 carriers 89.2 86.9
Other 100.0 100.0
Source: Mallet, The Commuter Carrier Industry-Growth and Stability, in RE-
FORM OF THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF AIR CARRIERS, Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
94 Cong., 2d Sess. 262 (1976).
(13) A summary of the evidence. The evidence that has been
amassed in various studies of the airline industry points in one very
clear direction: economies of scale are negligible or non-existent
at the overall firm level. This is certainly true for firms that have
reached the size of the smallest trunklines. The only disputed point
in the literature is whether the MES for an airline is small enough
so that the local-service carriers are also in the range of constant
costs or whether the local-services carriers still bear a unit cost
penalty because of their small size compared to the trunks. The
preponderance of evidence points toward the former conclusion.
Further, it is worth noting that the most recent evidence avail-
able draws the bulk of its statistical weight from the mid-to-late
1960's. Even if we assume that the local-service carriers suffered
a scale disadvantage at that time (whereas the trunks clearly did
not), the local-service carriers have grown substantially since then.
Table 4 shows the relative sizes of the four smallest trunks in 1966
and the local-service carriers in 1966 and in 1977. Through mer-
gers and internal growth, the local-service carriers have grown to
the point where they are all larger than the smallest trunkline of
a decade earlier. The three largest local-service carriers are clearly
of the same size level that Western, Braniff, and Continental were
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a decade earlier. The basic technology of running an airline has
not changed in this decade; there seems little reason for the deter-
minants of the economies of scale in the industry to have changed.
If the smaller four trunks were of a sufficient size to have reached
MES in the mid-to-late 1960's, the local-service carriers had surely
reached the MES point by the mid-to-late 1970's.
At the overall airline level, then, there are no unit cost advan-
tages or disadvantages over the observed range of company sizes.
The observed differences in unit costs are due primarily to route
characteristics and to management differences, not to scale effects.
When largely unrestricted price competition is permitted in this
industry, it is highly unlikely that only one or two firms will emerge
as the survivors. All eighteen of the current trunk and local-service
carriers appear to be of sizes that put them on an equal footing




Western 2,391 Continental 1,871
Braniff 2,236 Northeast 933
Local-Service Carriers:
Allegheny 428 Bonanza 219
Mohawk 423 Southern 196
Piedmont 381 Pacific 172
North Central 349 West Coast 163
Frontier 331 Central 118
Ozark 295 Lake Central 116
Trans-Texas 277
1977
Allegheny 3,643 Piedmont 1,261
Air West 2,036 Ozark 1,221
Frontier 1,887 Texas Int. 1,167
North Central 1,281 Southern 1,045
Source: CAB
with the other firms in the industry. Indeed, if we were to take the
size of the smallest local-service carrier as the MES point, then the
domestic airline industry, which generated 154,817 million RPM's
in 1977 would have room for over 100 efficient-size firms. The pos-
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sibility of "natural monopoly" or even of serious oligopoly prob-
lems that might require regulation in the airline industry is ex-
tremely remote.
C. City-pairs and Local Networks
We now turn our attention to the evidence concerning scale ef-
fects in individual city-pairs and in local networks. Unfortunately,
the evidence here is quite sparse.
Although most authors recognize that there must be some scale
effects in serving a city-pair, none have been able to quantify these
effects. Caves argued that the MES for serving a city-pair was' such
that four or five carriers may have been able to have offered service
in high traffic, short- or medium-haul markets and two or three
carriers could have offered service in high traffic long-haul mar-
kets." Only the top 100 markets as of the late 1950's had the pos-
sibility of more than two carriers offering service. These conclu-
sions were drawn from the evidence of a very limited number of
city-pairs in which carriers were authorized to provide nonstop
service but were declining to do so or were offering only token
service. These conclusions are impressionistic in nature, but, un-
fortunately, there have been no other efforts to measure these scale
effects.
The absence of such studies is not too surprising. With entry
into individual city-pairs strictly controlled by the CAB, there has
been little of the natural sorting of airlines into markets that might
provide "survivor technique" inferences concerning MES in city-
pairs. The best we can do is echo Caves in arguing that economies
of scale at the city-pair level clearly do not extend over all ranges
of output. There are over 200 nonstop city-pairs in which two or
more carriers compete on a more or less stable basis. If economies
of scale really did extend over the full range of observable output,
we would expect the scheduling rivalry that currently exists in these
markets to lead the larger firm, with the supposed lower costs and
hence greater capacity to add flights, gradually to drive its rivals
from the field. Such a tendency toward single carrier dominance
and "natural monopoly" in these markets simply has not occurred.
Thus, there surely is an MES point, with small markets able to
support only one carrier, larger markets able to support two car-
"8 See R. CAVES, supra note 11, at 95-97.
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riers efficiently, yet larger markets able to support three carriers,
etc. The location of these critical points will depend on the char-
acteristics of particular markets. For example, the passengers in
a short-haul market are likely to put a high value on scheduling
frequency. This means it is worthwhile for a carrier or carriers to
schedule smaller planes with more frequent flights than would be
the case in a long-haul market with an equal number of passengers.
But the larger number of flights probably means a greater number
of carriers can be supported efficiently in the market. Beyond this
general level of discussion, though, no precise location of these
critical points exists.
A new issue concerning the possibility of "natural monopoly" in
city-pair markets has recently been raised by William E. Fruhan.3 '
He argues that there is a strong tendency for the dominant carrier
in a market to attract a market share that is greater than its share
of capacity offered.' A plotting of market share against capacity
shares will yield an S-shaped curve. These apparent benefits to
market dominance may lead firms in city-pairs with more than one
carrier to try to achieve market dominance by scheduling more ca-
pacity. But if all carriers try simultaneously to attain this market
dominance, the end result may be a low-profit or even a loss equili-
brium for the firms involved. An implication of this possibility of
joint over-scheduling is that competition may not be viable in the
long run in these markets; losses may occur persistently when there
is competition. Hence, if normal profits are to be earned in the long
run in this market, a single carrier "natural monopoly" is the only
solution.
This model-we shall call it the Fruhan "S"-needs immediate-
ly to be differentiated from the other models of non-price rivalry
in regulated markets which have been developed by a number of
economists."' In the other models, scheduling can simply be inter-
39 W. FRUHAN, JR., THE FIGHT FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE Ch. 5 (1972).
40 The theory underlying the argument is simple: when seeking a reservation,
potential passengers are most likely to call the airline offering the greatest number
of flights. Caves had earlier raised this point. See R. CAVES, supra note 11, at 96.
41 See Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76 J. POL. ECON. 149 (1968);
White, Quality Variation When Prices are Regulated, 3 BELL J. ECON. & MGT.
SCIENCE 425 (1972); Yance, Nonprice Competition in Jet Aircraft Capacity, 21
J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 55 (1972); G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note 32; de
Vany, The Effects of Price and Entry Regulation on Airline Output, Capacity,
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preted as a form of non-price competition. Faced with a regulatory
prohibition on price competition, potentially competitive firms
turn to scheduling rivalry and continue to do so until any potential
excess profits (due to a potential margin of regulated price over
unit costs in the absence of scheduling rivalry) have been com-
peted away and only normal profits are earned. These models do
not predict loss equilibria, and the rivalry process is not consid-
ered destructive or necessarily socially undesirable. The Fruhan
"S" model is clearly different. The scheduling rivalry process is seen
as potentially destructive and undesirable.
Douglas and Miller and James C. Miller point out that the S-
shaped curve is a necessary condition for a loss equilibrium to
occur, but it is not a sufficient condition." Thus, even though the
S-shaped curve is a generally observed phenomenon in the airline
industry, this is no guarantee that loss equilibria are occurring.'
They also require myopic behavior by airline managements, and
they depend on management expectations of persistently high traf-
fic responses to capacity additions.
Further, there is substantial evidence that the loss equilibria pos-
sibilities predicted by the Fruhan "S" model are not found em-
pirically. First, the airline industry as a whole has earned more or
less normal, competitive profits over sustained periods;" this is not
consistent with serious loss equilibria. Second, a number of econo-
mists have provided evidence that the characteristics of most air-
line markets are such that loss equilibria are unlikely.' Third, the
and Efficiency, 6 BELL J. EcoN. 327 (1975); Schmalensee, Comparative Static
Properties of Regulated Airline Oligopolies, 8 BELL J. EON. 565 (1975).
1 G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note 32, at 47-49; Miller, Airline Market
Shares vs. Capacity Shares and the Possibility of Short-Run Loss Equilibria, in
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1978).
'For evidence on this point, see Eads, Competition in the Domestic Trunk
Airline Industry: Too Much or Too Little?, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN
REGULATED MARKETS 32 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
"See R. CAVES, supra note 11, Ch. 17; G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note
32, at 50, 117.
See J. Yance, The Possibility of Loss Producing Equilibria in Air Carrier
Markets (unpublished thesis, Boston U., Dept. of Econ. (1971)); G. DOUGLAS
& J. MILLER, supra note 32 at 49, 131-132; Eads, supra note 43 at 33-35; J. MILL-
ER, supra note 42. Also, in the CAB investigation of carrier agreements limiting
scheduling rivalry, both Administrative Judge Seaver and the Board itself rejected
the notion that destructive competition was a serious problem in the airline in-
dustry. See Initial Decision, CAB Docket No. 22908 (November 18, 1974), at
53-56; CAB Order 75-7-98 (July 21, 1975), at 9-10.
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evidence on scheduling rivalry is more consistent with the other
models of scheduling rivalry than with the Fruhan "S." Douglas
and Miller, Eads, and White have found that load factors (the
ratio of passengers to available seats-a measure of scheduling
rivalry) in city-pair markets decline as the number of carriers on
a route increases and as the potential profits on a route (proxied
by distance for the late 1960s) increase."0 Both effects are sig-
nificant statistically and quantitatively. Though the first effect is
predicted by the Fruhan "S" model, the second effect is not; the
potential profitability of a route should not affect the tendency
toward heavier scheduling in the Fruhan "S" model. But the po-
tential profitability of a route is an important determinant of heav-
ier scheduling in the other models mentioned above. Third, recent
preliminary evidence developed by Nancy Van Broekhoven 7 indi-
cates that at least part of the S-curve phenomenon is due to the
effects of an airline feeding passengers from its own connecting
flights on to its own flights in the market subject to rivalry; that is,
at least part of the reason why a carrier in a market is a dominant
carrier and has a higher than proportional market share is that it
schedules more flights to accommodate the passengers who are
feeding in from its own connecting flights and who have a high
likelihood of staying with that carrier. This explanation for the S-
curve throws doubt on the possibilities of management expecting
high traffic responses to extra capacity.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes at hand,
the Fruhan "S" model is one in which regulation prevents price
competition. With the possibility of price flexibility, scheduling
rivalry would no longer be the only major channel for competitive
efforts. Even if the loss equilibria phenomenon is a serious one
pointing toward "natural monopoly" in local markets under cur-
rent conditions-and the evidence above indicates otherwise-an
industry that had price flexibility would be unlikely to experience
these problems.
Evidence concerning local network effects is yet more sparse.
4 See G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note 32, at 53; Eads, supra note 43,
at 27-30; White, Quality, Competition, and Regulation: Evidence from the Air-
line Industry, in REGULATING THE PRODUCT 17 (R. Caves & M. Roberts eds.
1975).
4 7 Telephone conversation with Nancy Van Broekhoven, Apr. 20, 1978.
1979]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
There are clear a priori arguments for cost savings and marketing
advantages to local networks, at least up to some point. Virtually
all of the costs of terminal facilities can be shared if a number of
low volume routes converge on a single point. A carrier is likely
to retain a passenger on a high density, competitive route if that
carrier has also provided that passenger with a connecting flight
that feeds into the major route. But there is no published work
which would indicate the magnitude of these effects. The prelimi-
nary work by Van Broekhoven,"' indicates that there definitely are
beneficial effects to a carrier from having feeder flights connecting
with major flights, but the work is still too preliminary to yield
specific quantitative results.
The only real evidence we have is of a negative sort-that there
are limits to the advantages of network effects. Some carriers under
some circumstances do decline to provide service between some
city-pairs. As of 1975, there were thirteen out of the largest sev-
enty-two city-pair markets in which one or more carriers were not
offering nonstop service, though they were authorized by the CAB
to do so.' Between the late 1940's and 1975, the trunk airlines
abandoned service at 256 communities;-, between 1965 and 1975,
the local service airlines abandoned service at 107 cities."' Thus,
despite the possible advantages of local networks, the airlines have
been willing to decline to serve large numbers of routes.
A second piece of evidence bears yet more strongly on this issue.
In the cost studies by DOT and Douglas and Miller reported above,
the traffic density terms in the regressions had statistically signifi-
cant positive coefficients for the trunk carriers and positive though
statistically nonsignificant coefficients for the local-service and
overall industry regressions; unit costs tended to increase as market
density increased. The quantitative impact of these coefficients is
48 Id.
49 Snow, The Problems of Airline Regulation and the Ford Administration
Proposal for Reform, in REGULATION OF PASSENGER FARES AND COMPETITION
AMONG THE AIRLINES 26 (P. MacAvoy & J. Snow eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as P. MacAvoy & J. Snow eds.].
" U.S. Dep't of Transp., Regulatory Policy Staff, Air Service to Small Com-
munities, in id. at 83.
51 U.S. Dep't of Transp., Regulatory Policy Staff, Air Service to Small Com-
munities: Further Discussion of the Issues, in id. at 112.
62 U.S. Dep't of Transp., supra note 22; G. DOUGLAS and I. MILLER, supra
note 32.
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not great."' But the fact that they are not significantly negative
probably indicates that, for the range over which the current car-
riers---even the local-service carriers--operate, there do not seem
to be unit cost savings from further increases in average traffic
density.
It is also worth pointing out that even if local network effects
were substantial, this need not mean that one carrier would natural-
ly dominate a major local market. Suppose city-pair X-Y is other-
wise large enough to support three carriers, but that there are local
network advantages from cities A, B, C .. .feeding passengers
into the X-Y market. Competition in the X-Y market may still be
viable if each carrier has some of the feeder routes, allowing each
to gain the advantages of a local network. Even here, "natural mo-
nopoly" need not prevail.
The limited evidence we have presented so far indicates that,
though there probably are economies of scale at the city-pair and
local network level at low levels of output, they likely do not ex-
tend over all observable ranges. Since the carriers currently have
the possibility of scheduling rivalry open to them, any pervasive
economies of scale would give a larger firm an advantage in this
scheduling rivalry and lead eventually to single firm dominance in
individual markets. But this has not happened, leading one to be-
lieve that constant returns to scale prevailing beyond some MES
point best characterize these markets. The introduction of pricing
flexibility is not likely to change this picture. It will simply provide
another avenue for rivalry on the part of the carriers. The intro-
duction of fare flexibility does, of course, introduce the possibility
of predatory pricing. But, as Douglas and Miller and James L.
Hamilton and Michael K. Kawahura have argued, current sched-
uling rivalry offers the possibility of predatory behavior, so nothing
really new is being added on this score." In the short run, con-
tinued CAB regulatory power to prevent predatory pricing is prob-
ably wise. In the long run, reduction of regulatory entry barriers
into local markets is surely the best policy. A firm is less likely to
T3A partial explanation for the positive coefficient is that the high density
routes are those in which labor costs and rental rates are higher.
4G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note 32, at 132; Hamilton & Kawahara,
Predatory Non-Price Competition: The Case of Hawaiian Inter-Island Air Trans-
port, 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 82 (1975).
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engage in predatory actions if it knows that its attempts subsequent-
ly to reap the fruits of its predation are only likely to attract other
entrants. And, as we argue below, those potential entrants are like-
ly to be plentiful.
The absence of better evidence on scale effects in individual city-
pairs and on local network effects is frustrating. It would be satis-
fying to have a more precise idea of the size market that can sup-
port only one carrier efficiently, the size market that can sup-
port only two carriers, etc. It would be nice to know more precisely
how important local network effects are and when they stop being
important. But for policy purposes, this determination may be
much less important than the determination of economies of scale
at the national, firm-wide level of the previous studies. As long as
there are an appreciable number of viable firms at the national
level, then if regulatory entry restrictions are removed at the city-
pair level, we need not fear any long-term abuse by a "natural mo-
nopolist" in the local market. Any time a firm tried to exploit any
monopoly position for a sustained period, another firm would see
a profitable opportunity and enter the market. With eighteen trunk
and local-service carriers, a dozen or so supplemental carriers,
three or four intra-state carriers, two Hawaiian carriers, four Alas-
kan carriers, one international carrier (Pan American Airways),
and over 200 commuter carriers, the number of potential entrants
with at least some form of airline experience is quite high." The
non-regulatory entry barriers in the airline industry are not high,"M
so that even de nouveau entry would be a possibility. City-pair mar-
kets would not want for potential entrants.
The potency of potential entry in preventing abuse by "natural
monopolists" is indicated by the following evidence. In the com-
muter markets, where entry is unrestricted by regulation, James C.
Miller and Leroy Laney have computed the best-fit fare schedules
(fares related to distance) for those markets with only one com-
muter carrier (i.e., monopolies) and those with competitive car-
51 And, of course, if the United States were to lower its statutory "import
barriers" against foreign airlines serving domestic routes, the number of potential
entrants would be considerably higher.
"'See R. CAVES, supra note 11, at Ch. 4; W. JORDAN, supra note 21, Chs. 2,
10; R. PULSIFER et al., REPORT OF THE CAB SPECIAL STAFF ON REGULATORY RE-
FORM 107-116, 275 (1975).
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riers." The fare schedules are not substantially different from each
other; the monopolies did not charge significantly higher fares than
did the competitive carriers for comparable distances. This is quite
consistent with the proposition that ease of entry was preventing
the monopoly carriers from exploiting their power. This evidence
is in interesting contrast with that provided by Douglas and Miller,
Eads, and White." Trunk carriers with monopoly routes, protected
from entry by regulation, have consistently provided worse service
(as indicated by high load factors) in these markets, compared to
the service provided in competitive markets.
Easing regulatory entry barriers, then, is the best way of dealing
with any potential problems of "natural monopoly" that might exist
in local markets. The evidence at the firm level indicates over-
whelmingly that there will be plenty of potential entrants to pre-
vent monopoly abuses.
V. CONCLUSION
"Natural monopoly" is not a serious problem for the airline in-
dustry. The available evidence clearly indicates that all of the cur-
rent trunk and local-service carriers have reached a size at which
scale no longer affects unit costs. Thus, claims of economies of
scale in support of proposed mergers deserve very close scrutiny.
At the same time, the recent introduction of fare flexibility will
surely not lead to the monopolizing of the industry because of scale
effects. The structure of the industry may well change under the
regime of fare flexibility-some firms may expand and others con-
tract-but these changes will be due to the firms' management
abilities to deal with a more competitive environment and not to
any serious economies or diseconomies of scale. The end result will
be a healthier, leaner, more competitive, and more flexible industry.
"This evidence is found in U.S. Department of Transportation, Regulatory
Policy Staff, Analysis of Commuter Airline Fare Structures, in P. MacAvoy &
J. Snow eds., supra note 49, at 72-78.
"8G. DOUGLAS & J. MILLER, supra note 32, at 53; Eads, supra note 43, at
27-30; White, supra note 46.
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